Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Death Penalty - Felony Murder - Law of Principals by Nolin, Douglas R.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 21 Number 3 Article 9 
1983 
Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Death Penalty - Felony 
Murder - Law of Principals 
Douglas R. Nolin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas R. Nolin, Constitutional Law - Eighth Amendment - Death Penalty - Felony Murder - Law of 
Principals, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 749 (1983). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol21/iss3/9 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTH AMENDMENT-DEATH PENALTY-
FELONY MURDER-LAW OF PRINCIPALS-The United States Su-
preme Court has held that the death penalty may not be imposed
upon a defendant who did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to
kill.
Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
On the morning of April 1, 1975, Thomas and Eunice Kersey,
aged 86 and 74, were robbed and shot to death at their farmhouse
in central Florida.' According to the evidence, Sampson and
Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and
asked for water for their overheated car.' When Mr. Kersey came
out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun
at him and told Jeanette to take his money.' Upon hearing Mr.
Kersey's cries for help, Mrs. Kersey came to the door with a gun
and wounded Jeanette Armstrong.4 Sampson Armstrong, and pos-
sibly Jeanette, then shot and killed the Kerseys, and took their
money.5
Two witnesses testified that they saw a man in a car, the
description of which fit that of a car owned by Earl Enmund,6
parked in front of the Kerseys' about the time of the murders.
Another witness testified that Enmund was in that car with several
other persons prior to the time of the murders and that after the
time of the murders the car returned at high speed with Enmund
driving and a person lying down in the back seat.'
Enmund and the Armstrongs were indicted for the first-degree
murder and robbery of the Kerseys.9 Defendants Enmund and
Sampson Armstrong were tried together. 10 The judge instructed
the jury that a killing during the perpetration or attempted perpe-
tration of a robbery is first-degree murder and that no premedita-
1. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3370 (1982).








10. Id. The prosecutor maintained that "Sampson Armstrong killed the old people."
Id. (quoting Record at 1577).
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tion or intent is necessary."
The jury found Enmund and Armstrong both guilty of two
counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery and in a
separate sentencing hearing recommended the death penalty,1
2
which the trial judge imposed.13 Enmund appealed and the Florida
Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by Flor-
ida law.'4 The trial judge found four statutory aggravating circum-
stances and no applicable mitigating circumstances. 5 Therefore,
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances, and Enmund was given the death penalty."6
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence, and although the court admitted the facts were unclear as to
Enmund's part in the crime, they rejected his argument that he
could be found guilty of no more than second-degree murder under
Florida's felony murder rule.' 7 The court noted that by combining
the felony murder rule and the law of principals, Enmund could be
held responsible 8 and that the evidence was sufficient to allow the
jury to find as it did.'" The state supreme court altered the aggra-
11. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. The judge added that:
In order to obtain a conviction of first degree murder while engaging in the perpetra-
tion of or in the attempted perpetration of the crime of robbery, the evidence must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was
actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful
killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the
robbery.
Id.
12. Id. Under Florida procedure, a separate sentencing hearing is conducted in which
the jury advises the judge as to what sentence should be imposed. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(2) (West Supp. 1982).
13. 102 S. Ct. at 3370.
14. Id. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West Supp. 1982).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 3370. The four aggravating circumstances were:
[T]he capital felony was committed while Enmund was engaged in or was an accom-
plice in the commission of an armed robbery [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(d) (West
Supp. 1982)]; the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain, § 921.141(5)(f); it
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, § 921.141(5)(h); and Enmund was previ-
ously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence, § 921.141(5)(b).
Id. See Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1371-72 (Fla. 1981).
16. 102 S. Ct. at 3370.
17. Id. at 3371.
18. Id. The Court quoted the Florida Supreme Court as saying that the interaction of
the "felony murder rule and the law of principals combine to make a felon generally respon-
sible for the lethal acts of his co-felon." Id. (quoting 399 So. 2d at 1369). See Adams v.
State, 341 So. 2d 765, 768-69 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977), which held that
second degree felony murder applies only to accessories before the fact, as opposed to prin-
cipals in the second degree. For further explanation, see infra notes 174-180 and accompa-
nying text.
19. 102 S. Ct. at 3371. The Florida Supreme Court held that:
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vating circumstances and reduced the number to two, but since
there were no mitigating circumstances, the sentence was af-
firmed.20 In so doing the court expressly rejected Enmund's argu-
ment that in his case the death penalty was barred by the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution, in that the evidence
failed to show that he intended to take life.21
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
the question whether death is a valid penalty under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments for one who neither took, attempted to
take, nor intended to take a life.2' The Court reversed the lower
court, holding that death was an unconstitutional penalty for one
who lacked the intent to kill, and remanded Enmund's case for
proceedings consistent with that holding.2"
Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court, 4 first noted that
the Florida Supreme Court had held that the record only sup-
ported an inference that Enmund had been in the car at the time
of the killings, waiting to aid in the killers' escape, and that this
was enough under Florida law to make him a principal in the
crime.2 5 Thus it was irrelevant whether he did the killing himself,
or anticipated or intended that any killing be done. The Court con-
cluded that under these circumstances, the death penalty was in-
[T]he only evidence of the degree of [Enmund's] participation is the jury's likely in-
ference that he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the
crimes. The jury could have concluded that he was there, a few hundred feet away,
waiting to help the robbers escape with the Kerseys' money. The evidence, therefore,
was sufficient to find that the appellant was a principal of the second degree, con-
structively present aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of robbery. This
conclusion supports the verdicts of murder in the first degree on the basis of the
felony murder portion of section 782.04(1)(a).
102 S. Ct. at 3371 (quoting 399 So. 2d at 1370).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 3371. The Court explained that the Florida Supreme Court had held
that the findings that the murders were committed during a robbery and that they were
done for pecuniary gain referred to the same aspect of the crime and thus could only be
treated as one aggravating circumstance. The Court also explained that the Florida court
had cited Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1981), in holding that the finding that the
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel could not be approved. The Florida
Supreme Court in Armstrong had held that the evidence could only sustain that the shoot-
ing was spontaneous, precipitated by the resistance of Mrs. Kersey. Id. n.3.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 3371.
22. Id. See 102 S. Ct. 473 (1981).
23. 102 S. Ct. at 3379.
24. Id. at 3369. Justice White was joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's opinion and filed a separate con-
curring opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell,
and Justice Rehnquist.
25. Id. at 3371.
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consistent with the eighth and fourteenth amendments.26
Justice White explained that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment was directed, in part, at punish-
ments that are disproportionately harsh in comparison to the
crime being punishedY.2 The most recent case in which this test of
proportionality had been used was Coker v. Georgia,28 in which the
Supreme Court held that the death penalty was disproportionate
punishment for the crime of rape, and thus unconstitutional under
the eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.29 Justice
White observed that it was stressed in Coker that the Court's judg-
ment should be founded on objective factors, including the histori-
cal development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments,
international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have
made.3o
Justice White noted that the Coker plurality had found that
never, in the past fifty years, had a majority of the states author-
ized death as a penalty for rape. 1 The Coker Court had also ob-
served that in the reenactment of death penalty statutes to con-
form to the Furman v. Georgia3 2 criteria, only three states had
provided the penalty of death for the rape of an adult woman."
Thus the Coker plurality held that the legislative judgment
weighed heavily against imposing the death sentence for the crime
of rape. "
According to Justice White, of the thirty-six state and federal
jurisdictions authorizing the death penalty, only nine allow the
death penalty for participation in a robbery in which another rob-
ber takes life.36 Of the remaining twenty-seven jurisdictions, three
26. Id. at 3372.
27. Id. (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). See O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
28. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
29. 102 S. Ct. at 3372 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592).
30. 102 S. Ct. at 3372.
31. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 593).
32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 3372. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 594.
34. 102 S. Ct. at 3372. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
35. 102 S. Ct. at 3372 & n.5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.190.2(a)(17) (West Supp.
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1), 921.141(5)(d) (West 1976 and Supp.
1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101(b), (c), 27-2534.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
97-3-19(2)(e), 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(1)(b),(4), 200.033(4)
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-202(a), -203(i)(7) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(1)(c)(1),
.32.040(1) (1977 & Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-101, -102(h)(iv) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
Vol. 21:749
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do not allow the death penalty for felony murder."6 In eleven
states, proof of some sort of mental state is a prerequisite to con-
viction and without such proof, the actors in a felony murder
would not be subject to capital punishment.-" Four jurisdictions do
not allow the death penalty in a situation similar to the present
one.38
Justice White noted that the nine remaining jurisdictions deal
with the vicarious felony murder problem in their capital sentenc-
ing statute, none of them allowing capital punishment solely for
participation in the life-taking crime if the defendant did not do
the killing.3 In these states, the aggravating circumstances gener-
ally must outweigh the mitigating circumstances, although suffi-
cient aggravating circumstances will preclude the necessity for an
intent to kill.40 Six of the nine states make the fact that the defen-
dant was only an accomplice in a crime in which another commit-
ted a capital offense a statutory mitigating circumstance, thus les-
sening the chance that the death penalty will be imposed for a
vicarious felony murder conviction.4 1 The remaining three states
36. 102 S. Ct. at 3372-73 & n.6. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.001, .003, .008(2) (Vernon
1979) (death penalty may be imposed only for capital murder; felony murder is first degree
murder); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, :l(III), :1-a(I)(b)(2) (1974 & Supp. 1981) (capital
murder includes only killing a law enforcement officer, killing during a kidnapping, and
murder for hire); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502(a)(b), 1102 (Purdon 1982-83) (death pen-
alty may be imposed only for first-degree murder; felony murder is second-degree murder).
37. 102 S. Ct. at 3373 & nn.7-8. "Of these 11 states, 8 make knowing, intentional,
purposeful, or premeditated killing an element of capital murder." Id. See ALA. CODE §§
13A-2-23, -5-40(a)(2), -6-2(a)(1) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3), § 9-1(b)(6)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(1) (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Supp. 1982), §§ 31-18-14(a), -20A-50 (1981); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§
2903.01(B),(C),(D), 2929.02(A), 2929.04(A)(7) (Page 1982); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
19.02(a), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-
31(d) (Supp. 1981). Justice White also pointed out: "Three other states require proof of a
culpable mental state short of intent, such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human
life, before the death penalty may be imposed." 102 S. Ct. at 3373. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-1501(1)(a) (Supp. 1981), and Commentary; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2), (6)
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1981).
38. 102 S. Ct. at 3373 & nn.9-11. One state prohibits the death penalty for an individ-
ual who did not commit murder. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 410, 412(b),
413(d)(10),(e)(1) (Supp. 1981). Two jurisdictions prohibit capital punishment where the de-
fendant's participation was minor. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1473(c)(6)(D) (1976). One state limits the death penalty to narrow circumstances not in-
volved here (i.e., the victim was a peace officer or prison official). See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13,
§§ 2303(b), (c) (Supp. 1981).
39. 102 S. Ct. at 3374.
40. Id.
41. Id. The six states are Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703G(3) (Supp. 1982-
83); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f)(4) (West Supp. 1982); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (Burns 1979); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(6)
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exclude felony murder from the list of aggravating circumstances. "
Justice White observed that in each of these nine states, a non-
triggerman guilty of felony murder cannot be sentenced to death
for the felony murder absent aggravating circumstances above and
beyond the felony murder itself.'
3
Thus, the Court concluded that only a small majority of jurisdic-
tions allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the de-
fendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which
a murder was committed." The Court noted that even if this small
majority of nine states allows the death penalty for vicarious fel-
ony murder if sufficient additional aggravating circumstances are
present, only about one third of the American jurisdictions author-
ize death for a defendant who participated in a felony in which a
murder took place.' 6 In addition, of the eight states enacting death
penalty statutes since 1978, only one has allowed the death penalty
in such circumstances." In light of these findings, the Court noted
that although the weight of legislative judgment is not overwhelm-
ingly against the imposition of death where a defendant did not
take life, intend to take life, or attempt to take life, and although
the weight is not as great as in the Coker situation, it nevertheless
weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment in a situation
similar to Enmund's.4
7
Justice White examined the decisions juries have made when de-
ciding the liability of accomplices to felony murder.4 The Court
noted that the evidence was overwhelming that American juries
have repudiated imposition of the death penalty in such cases.'
Justice White first examined all reported appellate court decisions
since 1954 in cases where the defendant was executed for homicide,
(1979); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e) (1979); and North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15(A)-2000(f)(4) (Supp. 1981). 102 S. Ct. at 3374 n.12.
42. 102 S. Ct. at 3374. The three remaining states are Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(f)
(1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 1981-82); and South Dakota,
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1982). 102 S. Ct. at 3374 n.13.
43. 102 S. Ct. at 3374.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The one state allowing for the death penalty in these circumstances is Wash-
ington. The other seven noted are Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and South Dakota. 102 S. Ct. at 3374 n.14.
47. Id. at 3374.
48. Id. at 3375. Justice White quoted Coker in commenting on the examination of jury
verdicts: "As we have previously observed, '[t]he jury ... is a significant and reliable objec-
tive index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.'" 102 S. Ct. at 3375
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 596).
49. 102 S. Ct. at 3375.
Vol. 21:749
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and found that of 362 executions, only six were of non-triggerman
felony murderers, and all six took place in 1955.50 By contrast, be-
tween 1955 and the Coker decision in 1977, seventy-two executions
for rape took place.5
Secondly, Justice White examined the petitioner's survey of the
nation's death-row population and observed that this study
showed that juries have rejected the death penalty in cases where
the defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when
the killing took place, and did not participate in a plan to mur-
der.52 Of 796 inmates on death row, only three had been sentenced
to die who were not present at the killing and did not hire or so-
licit the killers to do the killing.5 The figures for Florida were sim-
ilar. Of the forty-five felony murderers on death row, only one,
Enmund, was sentenced without having been the triggerman and
without some showing of intent to kill." These findings were not
challenged by the State.55
Justice White noted the dissenting Justices' criticism of the sta-
tistics. These Justices argued that the numbers did not reveal the
percentage of homicides which were charged as felony murder nor
the number of times the death penalty was sought for a felony
murder accomplice. Justice White explained that this information
would probably be impossible to acquire and that, even if it were,
it would be relevant to know that prosecutors rarely sought the
death penalty for accomplice felony murder, as this would show
that prosecutors, as representatives of society's interests in punish-
ing crimes, consider the death penalty excessive for accomplice fel-
ony murder.56 The Court stated that it was not aware of one per-
son who had been executed in the last quarter century for a felony
50. Id. The statistics showed that of the 362 executions, 339 were executions of per-
sons who had personally murdered, two involved persons who had others do the killing, and
in 16 cases the facts were insufficient to make any conclusion. Id. The statistics were taken
from Brief for Petitioner, app. D, Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
51. Id. n.18.
52. 102 S. Ct. at 3375.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 3375-76. As of October 1, 1981, there were 796 inmates awaiting exe-
cution for homicide, 739 of whom there was sufficient data. Of these, only 41 had not partic-
ipated in the fatal assault. There was sufficient data on 40 of the 41 to deduce that only 16
were not physically present at the killing. Id. See Brief for Petitioner, app. E, Enmund v.
Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 3376. In 36 of those cases the courts made some finding that the killer
intended to kill, while in eight of the cases no findings were made dealing with intent, but in




murder in which he did not actually kill, attempt to kill, or intend
to kill. 7 Justice White maintained that the statistics likewise could
not be discounted by attributing to the petitioner the argument
that death is unconstitutional punishment absent intent to kill.
56
He noted that the petitioner was rather arguing that, as applied to
him, the death penalty was disproportionate. Justice White con-
cluded that the statistics tended to support that argument.59
Justice White next stated that, although the judgments of legis-
latures and juries weigh heavily, the ultimate question is whether
the eighth amendment allows the imposition of death on one who
is an accomplice to a felony in which a murder is committed, but
who did not actually kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.60 The
Court concluded that it did not."' Justice White noted that rob-
bery is a serious crime, yet when tested in an analysis such as was
used in Coker, the conclusion is reached that the death penalty,
being unique in its severity and irrevocability, is too great a pen-
alty for the robber who, as such, does not kill.2
The Court found that the defendants here committed murder,
but were subject to the death penalty only because they killed as
well as robbed. 3 Justice White indicated that the question was not
the disproportionality of death as a penalty for murder, but rather
the validity of the punishment as it related to Enmund's own con-
duct. 4 The Court reaffirmed the need for individualized considera-
tion as a constitutional requirement for the imposition of the death
penalty.65 Justice White emphasized that Enmund did not kill, and
the record showed no intention on his part to kill, yet Florida law




60. Id. at 3376-77.
61. Id. at 3377.
62. Id. The Court at this point followed the analysis used in Coker, quoting from that
case, substituting terms dealing with robbery where the Coker Court had discussed rape:
[Ilt does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of
human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, [robbery] by defini-
tion does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim
of the murderer; for the [robbery] victim, life . . . is not over and normally is not
beyond repair.
Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 598).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
64. Id.
65. Id. In discussing individualized treatment, the Court referred to Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
756 Vol. 21:749
Recent Decisions
bery in which a murder was committed. 6 Justice White, noting
that a basic precept of criminal justice is that the intentional in-
fliction of harm must be punished more severely than the uninten-
tional infliction of harm, 7 determined that the similar treatment
of Enmund and his co-felons under Florida law was impermissible
under the eighth amendment.6
Justice White stated that the primary purposes of the death
penalty, as the Gregg Court had held, are retribution and deter-
rence.69 Unless the death penalty, when imposed in Enmund's situ-
ation would contribute to one or both of these goals, its infliction
would constitute unnecessary pain and suffering and would thus be
unconstitutional. 70 Subjecting Enmund's sentence to this criterion,
Justice White concluded that it would not contribute to deterrence
as the death penalty can only deter one who premeditates murder,
and in Enmund's case, the premeditation was absent.
7'
Justice White found that the death penalty would have valid de-
terrent value if the likelihood of a killing during the perpetration
of a felony were much greater. However, he noted that statistics
utilized by the American Law Institute in its formulation of the
Model Penal Code showed that the instances where death occurred
during a robbery were so few that the death penalty could not be
justified as a deterrent for the underlying felony.
72
Justice White examined the retributional character of the death
penalty as imposed in the present situation. He found that retribu-
tion as a justification for this punishment would depend on the
degree of Enmund's culpability and thus his intention.7 3 The Court
noted other cases in which a punishment was held to be excessive
in the absence of criminal wrongdoing,74 and found that Enmund's
66. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
67. Id. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 162 (1968).
68. 102 S. Ct. at 3377.
69. Id. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
70. 102 S. Ct. at 3377. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
71. 102 S. Ct. at 3377-78. Justice White explained that "if a person does not intend
that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility
that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not 'enter into the
cold calculus that precedes the decision to act."' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
186).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 3378. The American Law Institute (ALI) statistics showed that in
three locations surveyed, the percentages of robberies that were accompanied by homicides,
as compared to the total number of robberies, were .49%, .59% and .41%. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.1, comment at 38, n.96 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
73. 102 S. Ct. at 3378 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
74. 102 S. Ct. at 3378. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), a statute making
narcotics addiction a crime was struck down; in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
1983 757
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punishment must fit his personal responsibility and moral guilt.75
To put Enmund to death for killings he did not commit would not
accomplish the purpose of retribution, and legislatures have not
found it to do so. Thus, the Court concluded that retribution was
not a valid reason for the imposition of the death penalty here.76
The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Florida Su-
preme Court upholding the death penalty and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.
77
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's decision, but stated his
view that the death penalty in all situations is cruel and unusual
punishment and thus violative of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. 8
79In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Court's holding was not supported by the analysis of the previous
cases and, by making intent a matter of federal constitutional law,
interfered with the states' criteria for assessing legal guilt.80 Justice
O'Connor restated the facts of the case, noting some additional tes-
timony given.81 These additional facts dealt with the testimony of
Ida Jean Shaw, Enmund's common law wife. Shaw testified that
Enmund and the Armstrongs were staying at her house the day
before the murders and that on the day of the murders the three
were gone, as was Shaw's 1969 yellow Buick. 2 Some time after
eight o'clock she was told that Jeanette had been shot, and upon
learning that she had been shot during a robbery, Shaw asked
Enmund why he committed the robbery. 83 According to Shaw,
Enmund answered that he had decided to rob Kersey after seeing
his money earlier. Shaw also testified that Sampson had volun-
teered that he had made sure the Kerseys were dead.8 4 Shaw said
(1910), the Court struck down a statute that made it a crime for a public official to falsify
records without a requirement of some intent; in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), a
death sentence based on an aggravating circumstance was vacated because the crime did not
involve a heightened level of "depraved" consciousness. 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 3378.
76. Id. at 3378-79.
77. Id. at 3379.
78. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan indicated that he had adhered to
this view in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79., 102 S. Ct. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Record at 1185-1188, 1198-1202, 1205, 1207-1208).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3379-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
758 Vol. 21:749
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that she had disposed of two pistols, pursuant to Sampson's
instructions."5
Justice O'Connor noted that the prosecutor had not argued that
Enmund had killed the Kerseys, but instead maintained that he
had planned the robberies and was in the car during the killings.8 6
Justice O'Connor also looked at the four aggravating circum-
stances found by the trial court in its sentencing hearing.87 She
noted that the trial court had found that the evidence showed that
Enmund's involvement was not minor but that in fact he had
planned the felony and had actively participated in an attempt to
avoid detection.88
Justice O'Connor dealt more extensively with the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, focusing on that court's discussion con-
cerning whether Enmund was a principal or an accessory to the
crime." Under Florida law, if he were present, aiding and abetting
the commission, he was equally guilty. The aider and abettor does
not have to be actually present to be considered a principal, as his
presence may be constructive.90 The Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that the evidence was sufficient to find the petitioner a
principal under Florida law.' 1
Justice O'Connor agreed that Enmund's claim was that the
death penalty, as applied to him, was unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate to the role he had played in the crime, and because he had
no actual intent to kill the victims, capital punishment was too ex-
treme a penalty. 92 She noted that in Gregg v. Georgia, a majority
of the Court had held that the death penalty does not invariably
violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment.9' The Justice emphasized that in no case since Gregg
has the Court retreated from this position, but explained that rec-
ognition of the constitutionality of the death penalty was only the
85. Id. at 3380 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. See supra note 15.
88. Id. at 3381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 3382 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. According to the Florida court "if the accused was present aiding and abetting
the commission or attempt of one of the violent felonies listed in the first-degree murder
statute, he is equally guilty, with the actual perpetrator of the underlying felony, of first-
degree murder." 399 So. 2d at 1370. The Florida court also referred to Pope v. State, 84 Fla.
428, 94 So. 865 (1922), noting that presence at a crime may be either actual or constructive.
102 S. Ct. at 3382 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. 102 S. Ct. at 3382 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




first part of the Enmund inquiry."4 She observed that Enmund was
not convicted of a deliberate killing, but was convicted through the
doctrine of accessorial liability of two murders that he did not in-
tend to commit.9 " Thus, the concept of proportionality had to be
applied to Enmund to determine if his punishment was dispropor-
tionate to his crime.
9 6
Justice O'Connor noted that the concept of proportionality was
first fully expressed in Weems v. United States.9 7 Not until two-
thirds of a century later was a punishment declared unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate.9 8 The Court in Coker v. Georgia9 con-
cluded that rape, although a heinous crime, did not warrant the
severity of the death penalty. The plurality was careful to use ob-
jective factors to reach its decision so as to derive, from evolving
societal standards, the meaning of the requirement of proportion-
ality which is within the eighth amendment. 100
Justice O'Connor noted that the Coker plurality had shown that
in fifty years a majority of the states had never authorized death as
a punishment for rape, that only three of the thirty-five states that
reinstituted the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia defined
rape as a capital offense, and that in at least ninety percent of the
rape convictions since 1973, juries in Georgia had not imposed the
death sentence. 101 According to Justice O'Connor, the conclusion
reached in Coker rested, at least in part, on the conclusion, backed
by observation of facts, that both legislatures and juries had finally
rejected the death sentence for rape cases.
10 2
Justice O'Connor then stated that the Coker plurality had also
considered certain qualitative factors bearing on whether the death
94. Id. at 3384 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Id. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Justice O'Connor explained:
[Diefendant Weems was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor for falsifying a pub-
lic document. After remarking that 'it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense,' and after comparing Weems'
punishment to the punishments for other crimes, the Court concluded that the sen-
tence was cruel and unusual.
102 S. Ct. at 3385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
98. 102 S. Ct. 3385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
100. 102 S. Ct. at 3385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See 433 U.S. at 592; Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.). In Trop, the Court discussed the eighth
amendment in terms of the standards of a civilized society. Id. at 99.
101. 102 S. Ct. at 3385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
102. 102 S. Ct. at 3386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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penalty was disproportionate, including the heinousness of the
crime of rape, and noted that although the Coker plurality admit-
ted that rape was quite a heinous crime, they felt that death was a
grossly disproportionate punishment.'0 3 Thus, Justice O'Connor
concluded that Coker showed that the determination of propor-
tionality requires not only a study of contemporary standards, but
also the notion that the magnitude of the punishment must be re-
lated to the harm done the victim and the degree of blameworthi-
ness of the defendant, bringing into play the individualized consid-
eration enunciated in Lockett v. Ohio.1
0 4
In sum, Justice O'Connor found that the Court should not de-
cide only if the death penalty as imposed here offended contempo-
rary standards as reflected in the responses of legislatures and ju-
ries, but also whether it was disproportionate as to this particular
defendant's crime and whether the sentencing procedures satisfied
the constitutional requirement of individualized consideration set
forth in Lockett.10 5
Justice O'Connor then looked at the historical development of
the felony murder rule. First, she commented that the data pro-
vided by the petitioner relating to the historical analysis of the
death sentence and felony murder failed to show that society has
rejected such punishment. 06 Justice O'Connor noted the common
law origins of the felony murder rule, and its transplantation to the
American colonies.10 7 She explained that the use of the felony mur-
der rule continued largely unabated until legislative reforms re-
stricted its use in the twentieth century.
08
Justice O'Connor discounted the petitioner's argument that ju-
ries and judges had virtually nullified the use of the rule by acquit-
ting defendants in felony murder cases, or convicting them of non-
capital crimes.109 She found the argument merely speculative, and
concluded that jury nullification was due in large part to jury dis-
satisfaction with mandatory death sentences." 0 Thus, she deter-
103. Id. Although the Coker Court felt rape was a heinous and reprehensible crime,
almost equal to murder, the differentiating factor was that a rape did not involve the taking
of human life and thus the death penalty was disproportionate for that crime. 433 U.S. at
597-98.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 3386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 438 U.S. 586).
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 3386-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 3387 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3387-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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mined that it was impossible to conclude that the country has his-
torically rejected the death penalty for felony murder."'
Justice O'Connor looked critically at the petitioner's use of the
statistics on jury verdicts and insisted that because these figures
did not reveal the number or percentage of homicides which were
charged as felony murders, they failed to prove the petitioner's
point." 2 Since the petitioner must have been arguing that the pen-
alty is unconstitutional absent an intent to kill (otherwise the de-
fendants who hire killers would escape the death penalty), the data
were not entirely relevant. At best, Justice O'Connor allowed, the
figures showed that sentencers were especially cautious when im-
posing the death sentence." 3
Justice O'Connor then examined the statistics offered by the pe-
titioner to show legislative judgment on this issue and noted that
of the thirty-five states which have the death penalty, thirty-two of
them authorize a sentencer to impose the death penalty for a death
which occurs during the course of a robbery.'1 4 She explained that
each one of those thirty-two can be classified as one of three
types."15 The first category contains twenty-one statutes which al-
low the death penalty for felony murder, even though the particu-
lar defendant did not kill or have intent to kill."" Three more re-
quire a finding of intent, but not the type of intent that this
petitioner claimed was constitutionally mandated.'1 7 The second
category contains seven statutes which only allow the death pen-
alty if the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim."'
The third class is made up of those statutes which restrict the
death penalty in felony murder to the one who actually committed
the killing."' Justice O'Connor explained that this showed that in
111. Id.
112. Id. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 3388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) "[S]entencers ... reserve that punishment
for those . . .who are sufficiently involved in the homicide, whether or not there was spe-
cific intent to kill." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming.
For the statutes involved see supra notes 35-37.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 3389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). These three states are Arkansas,
Delaware, and Kentucky. See supra note 37.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 3389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The states are Alabama, Illinois,
Louisiana, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See supra notes 35-37.
119. 102 S. Ct. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). These three states are Illinois, Mar-
yland, and Virginia. See supra notes 35-37. Justice O'Connor classified Illinois and Virginia
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nearly half of the states (two-thirds of those that permit the death
penalty for murder) a defendant may be sentenced to death with-
out having killed the victim and without having specifically in-
tended that the victim die. 1 0 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
petitioner failed to meet the standards of Coker and that thus it
was not shown that the death penalty for felony murder fell short
of the national "standards of decency."
1 21
Justice O'Connor noted that the concept of proportionality of
the death penalty involves more than a mere measurement of con-
temporary standards of decency. It requires also that the penalty
imposed be proportional to the harm caused and the defendant's
blameworthiness, factors critical to Coker.' 2 Justice O'Connor crit-
icized the Court for characterizing Enmund as only a "robber" and
stressed that lives were unjustifiably taken. She maintained that
Enmund was legally responsible, as an accomplice, and therefore
he could not claim that the penalty was grossly disproportionate to
the harm done.
123
Justice O'Connor then stated that the majority's holding was es-
pecially disturbing because the effect was to make intent a matter
of federal constitutional law, requiring review of highly subjective
definitional problems which are customarily left to state criminal
law.12 4 She argued that the Court had erred in the sense of sug-
gesting that intent can be ascertained readily, when in fact intent
is a legal concept not easily defined.1 25 Justice O'Connor expressed
dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to explain why the concept
of proportionality requires rejection of blameworthiness based on
other levels of intent, such as the intent to commit an armed rob-
bery coupled with the knowledge of the risk involved.1 6 She ex-
plained that the majority's intent-to-kill requirement failed to take
into account the complex picture of the defendant's knowledge of
his accomplice's intent and whether he was armed, the defendant's
part in the planning, and the level of the defendant's actual partic-
in both the second and third categories.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 3390 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3390-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Coker, the Court had stressed that
"in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does
not compare with murder, which. . . involve[s] the unjustified taking of human life." 433
U.S. at 598.






ipation.127 She insisted that the determination of the degree of
blameworthiness is best left to the sentencer who can examine the
unique facts of each case. 128 Justice O'Connor argued that, al-
though the type of mens rea is an important factor in assessing the
proper penalty, it is not so critical as to require a finding of intent
before imposing the death penalty.
129
Justice O'Connor came to the conclusion that the petitioner and
the Court had failed to prove that contemporary standards pre-
cluded the imposition of the death penalty for accomplice felony
murder. She found that examination of the qualitative factors un-
derlying the concept of proportionality had not shown the death
penalty to be disproportionate to Enmund's culpability. 130 Finally,
she found that due to the unique and complex mixture of facts
involving a defendant's actions, knowledge, and motive in a felony
murder, the fact finder is in the best position to determine the de-
fendant's blameworthiness. Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that
the death penalty was not disproportionate even though no intent
to kill was shown on the part of Enmund."'3
Justice O'Connor next observed that, although she would hold
this sentence constitutional, she would remand for a new sentenc-
ing hearing, stressing the need for focus on the individual charac-
ter of the defendant. 32 Because of this need for individualized
treatment, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering
any mitigating circumstances the defendant might proffer.' 3 Thus,
the sentencer could consider any lack of intent on the part of the




130. Id. at 3392 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that in contrast to
the crime in Coker, Enmund's crime involved the very type of harm the Court had held
justified the death penalty. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Justice O'Connor cited Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), noting that the
Court had held that there must be consideration of individual defendants when making
capital sentencing decisions. 102 S. Ct. at 3392 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
also referred to Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), in which the Court, in a
plurality decision, struck down a mandatory capital punishment statute, saying that, to give
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the eighth amendment any form, capital
sentencers must consider relevant factors of the character and record of the individual de-
fendant and the diverse frailties of human beings. 102 S. Ct. at 3392-93 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor then noted that in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, the Court held
that because the death penalty is so profoundly different from other forms of punishment,
individualized decisions are essential. 102 S. Ct. at 3393 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. 102 S. Ct. at 3393 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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to the defendant's minor role in the felony."
4
Justice O'Connor then examined the procedure in the Florida
courts in which the trial court found four aggravating circum-
stances. She reviewed the aggravating circumstances and noted
that the court had expressly found no statutory mitigating circum-
stances, and had rejected Enmund's claim of relatively minor par-
ticipation in the crimes. She noted also that the Florida Su-
preme Court had altered the conclusions of the trial court, but
concluded that since the trial judge had erroneously believed the
petitioner had shot the victims while they lay prone, in order to
eliminate them as witnesses, the trial judge eliminated any oppor-
tunity for individualized consideration of the petitioner's minor
role in the slayings. 36 Because this misinterpretation of the facts
precluded any consideration of the petitioner's major mitigating
circumstance, Justice O'Connor concluded that the case should
have been remanded for reconsideration, although the death pen-
alty should have been affirmed.
187
The Court's reasoning in Enmund follows what has now become
a standard analysis for examining death penalty questions. The
method used - that of examining legislative decisions, jury findings,
and historical developments - to determine the extent to which the
punishment is "cruel and unusual," is the standard litany estab-
lished in preceding death penalty decisions, most notably Coker v.
Georgia.3s In Coker, the Court explained that punishments would
be unconstitutional not only if found to be "barbaric" in nature,
but also if "excessive in relation to the crime committed." 3 9 In
Gregg v. Georgia,'" the Court also addressed the issue of excessive
punishments and found that a punishment would be considered
134. Id. Justice O'Connor added: "Because of the peculiar circumstances of this case, I
conclude that the trial court did not give sufficient consideration to the petitioner's role in
the crimes, and thus did not consider the mitigating circumstances proffered by the defen-
dant at his sentencing hearing." (Footnote omitted). Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3394 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. See 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
139. Id. at 592. The cases involved in the discussion in Coker were Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death, as a penalty is not "cruel and unusual," but sentences remanded
due to inadequacies of the statutes involved); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(statute making narcotics addiction a crime struck down); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)
(loss of citizenship too great a punishment for wartime desertion); and Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (statute making it a crime for public officials to falsify records
without any requirement of intent invalidated).
140. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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excessive if it (1) made no contribution to the goals of punishment,
or (2) was disproportionate to the crime.1"' The Gregg Court out-
lined the present concept of proportionality by setting forth the
objective factors to be addressed when making a judgment as to
the excessiveness of a punishment.142 These objective factors in-
clude the history and precedent of the death penalty, legislative
attitudes toward the death penalty, and the responses of juries as
reflected in their sentencing decisions. 43
The issue of the death penalty's proportionality for felony mur-
der had been available for discussion by the Court once prior to
Enmund, in the case of Lockett v. Ohio,'" which followed Gregg
by two years. In Lockett, the Court was presented with a fact situ-
ation similar to Enmund. The driver of a getaway car had been
sentenced to death after having been convicted vicariously for the
murders committed by her partners. The Court held that death
was an unconstitutional penalty for Lockett, based on the inade-
quacies of the Ohio sentencing statute, and did not address the
felony murder aspect. Justice White concurred in the decision, but
asserted that due to Lockett's lack of intent to kill, the death pen-
alty, as applied to her, was automatically unconstitutional.
45
Justice White's position in Lockett, focusing on the issue of in-
tent or the lack thereof in imposing the death penalty, appears to
have become the rule in Enmund. The intent issue is apparent in
Enmund's actual holding: that death is an unconstitutional pun-
ishment when the defendant does not intend to kill, attempt to
kill, or actually kill. Because of the felony murder aspects of the
case, however, there may be a tendency to interpret Enmund more
broadly, i.e., that felony murder may not be punished by death.
Such an interpretation would ignore the critical factor of Enmund,
the accessorial element.1
46
Under the common law, the felony murder rule provided that if,
in the perpetration of a felony, the conduct of the felon brought
about an unintended death, the felon was guilty of murder.147 The
141. Id. at 173, 183-87.
142. Id. at 175-83.
143. Id. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
144. 438 U.S, 586 (1978).
145. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring). Justice White declared "it violates the Eighth
Amendment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed
a purpose to cause the death of the victim." Id.
146. See infra notes 161-180 and accompanying text.
147. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (5th ed. 1979). See also R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 61 (1982).
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rule allows for the imputation of intent to a felon who otherwise
lacks the mens rea necessary for an intentional killing. 4" Without
the felony murder rule, the intent which is generally necessary for
murder would not be present. The felony murder rule takes the
intent to do the underlying felony, and imputes it to the killing,
thus allowing a finding of murder. '49
As noted by Justice O'Connor in Enmund,1 50 the felony murder
rule was effectively abolished in England when Parliament de-
clared that an unintentional killing during a felony would be classi-
fied as manslaughter.1 5' However, the rule continued relatively un-
hindered in the United States, although legislatively altered, well
into the twentieth century. 5"
The felony murder rule is limited in its application in that it
merely increases the severity of punishment applicable, and does
not make a crime that which is not otherwise criminal. Neverthe-
less, the rule has been criticized.'13 One criticism of the rule is that
it bases criminal responsibility on an unexpected result. 15 4 Other
criticisms are that the rule allows absurd results in situations
where some statutory felonies are less serious than some common
law misdemeanors1 5 5 and that it is merely technical and arbi-
trary.1 56 It has also been found to be difficult to enforce due to the
148. R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 61.
149. Id. at 62. Perkins described the early doctrinal history of the rule as follows:
An ancient writer spoke of death resulting from any unlawful act as murder. 'If the
act be unlawful,' said Coke, writing in the early 1600's, 'it is murder.' Lord Hale,
writing not long after, was unwilling to speak in such sweeping terms and gave illus-
trations of killings resulting from unlawful acts, some of which he said were murder
and others manslaughter. This was given more definite form by Foster, about a cen-
tury and a half later, to this effect: An accidental homicide resulting from an unlawful
act (with the qualification "if it be malum in se") is murder if the crime is of the
grade of felony, but otherwise it is manslaughter.
Id. This seems to have been the view accepted by Blackstone, when his works were pub-
lished just prior to the Revolution. See R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 62. But about a
century later, Judge Stephen, in Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62 J.P. 711 (1898), commented that
he doubted that the rule was actually the law. See R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 63.
150. See 102 S. Ct. at 3387 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 3387 nn.28-29. See English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11.
152. 102 S. Ct. at 3387 n.30. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the
Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REv. 356, 364-65 (1978); Alderstein, Felony
Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 Au. J. CRiM. L. 249, 251-52 (1976).
153. See Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 51, 52
(1956).
154. Id. (citing FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW at xxvii-xxix
(1839)).
155. Ludwig, supra note 153, at 52.
156. Id. at 53.
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fact that juries, rather than applying what they feel is an overly
harsh rule, acquit.15
For whatever reasons, the courts and legislatures in the United
States, although not entirely eliminating the felony murder rule,
have moved away from the notion that a death occurring during
any felony is murder. 15  The rule has been limited to felonies
which exhibit substantial human risk,159 or "inherently dangerous
felonies" such as arson, rape, robbery, and burglary. 160
Florida has a statutory version of the felony murder rule in
which imposition of a first degree murder conviction using the fel-
ony murder concept is restricted to eight distinct crimes.'' The
Florida statute also allows for second and third degree felony mur-
der, neither of which is subject to the death penalty.62 Enmund
was convicted of first degree felony murder under section
782.04(1).163
157. Id.
158. See R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 64, discussing Powers v. Commonwealth, 110
Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735 (1901) (removal of a cornerstone was a felony, but death occurring
from the accidental dropping of the stone was not felony murder); People v. Pavlic, 227
Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) (although liquor was sold in a manner amounting to a fel-
ony, the purchaser's death by drunkenness and exposure was not felony murder).
159. See R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 63.
160. See R. MORELAND, LAW OF HOMICIDES 48 (1952).
161. The Florida statute reads, in pertinent part:
The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when commit-
ted by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any
arson, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; or which resulted
from the unlawful distribution of opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound,
derivative, or preparation of opium, by a person 18 years of age or older ... shall be
murder in the first degree and shall constitute a capital felony, punishable as pro-
vided in § 775.082.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 1976, & Supp. 1983).
162. Subsections three and four of § 782.04 provide for the second and third degrees of
murder:
(3) When a person is killed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate,
any arson, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb by a person other
than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such
felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony shall be guilty
of murder in the second degree. ...
(4) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated without any design to
effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of, [or attempt of one of the
seven felonies enumerated in (3)], shall be murder in the third degree. ...
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(3), .04(4Y (West 1976, & Supp. 1983).
163. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (West Supp. 1982). Enmund argued that the
most serious crime he could be convicted of was second degree felony murder, under the
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The other concept used in Enmund, which is crucial to a proper
interpretation of the case, is the common law concept of principals.
In dealing with felonies, the common law categorized the guilty ac-
tors as principals and accessories.16 4 Originally, the actual perpe-
trator of a crime was characterized as a principal, and all other
actors were categorized as either accessories before the fact, at the
fact, or after the fact.165 Eventually the "at the fact" distinction
was dropped and any actor who would have been so classified was
considered a principal in the second degree.'66 The other two ac-
cessory distinctions - "before the fact" and "after the fact" - re-
mained. Thus, there are four categories of involvement in a crime
(two principals and two accessories). Corresponding to these are
four levels of culpability: (1) perpetrators; (2) abettors; (3) inciters;
and (4) criminal protectors.6 7
Perpetrators are those actors who, with mens rea, caused the
crime, either by their hands, or through some instrument which
they put in motion. 68 Perpetrators are principals in the first de-
gree.' 9 Abettors (also known as "aiders and abettors") also have
mens rea, but do not cause the actual harm. They are, however,
present, either actually or constructively, ready and willing to give
aid to the perpetrator if necessary.1 70 Abettors are principals in the
second degree.17 ' Inciters are similar to abettors in that they have
mens rea and render aid, counsel, or encouragement to the perpe-
trator. But they differ in that they are not actually or construc-
tively present at the scene.172 Inciters are accessories before the
fact.'" The fourth level of culpability is that of the criminal pro-
tector. These are the actors who know nothing of the crime when
perpetrated, but who in some way aid the perpetrator after the
crime is committed, being fully aware that a crime has been corn-
former § 782.04(2), the applicable part of which is now codified at § 782.04(3) (West Supp.
1982). See Act of Dec. 8, 1972, ch. 72-724, § 3, 1972 Fla. Laws 15, 17-18. See supra note 161.
Under this section, Enmund could have been subject, at most, to life imprisonment. See
Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d at 1368, 1370. See also Historical Note, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
782.04 (West 1976).
164. R. PERKINS, supra note 147, at 727.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 723.
168. Id. at 724.
169. Id. at 726.
170. Id. at 724.
171. Id. at 726.
172. Id. at 725.
173. Id. at 726.
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mitted.174 Criminal protectors are considered accessories after the
fact.
175
Generally, principals of the second degree are equally responsi-
ble for any action taken by principals in the first degree, as long as
the action can be considered to have been done in the furtherance
of the crime.1 76 In other words, any participant in a crime who can
be classified as an abettor, and yet does not reach the level of in-
volvement of a perpetrator, will nonetheless be responsible for any
actions taken by a perpetrator.
Through the combination of the law of principals and the felony
murder rule, a participant in an "inherently dangerous felony"
would be responsible for any death which occurred due to the ac-
tion of a co-felon, even if the death was accidental. When a death
occurs during an "inherently dangerous felony," the felony murder
rule imputes the murderous intent to the killing, making the kill-
ing murder. The law of principals allows the responsibility for that
murder to flow to all abettors, or second degree participants. In a
state that would allow the death penalty for a felony murder,
therefore, it is conceivable that the death penalty could be im-
posed upon someone who did not in fact commit a killing. This is
exactly what occurred in Enmund.
In Enmund, the Florida Supreme Court177 explained that under
Florida law, participants in a crime are either principals of the first
or second degree, and both are equally guilty of the crime commit-
ted.17 8 In 1957, the Florida legislature eliminated any distinction
between principals in the first or second degree, and accessories
before the fact.17 9 In 1972, the Florida murder statute was re-
vised, 80 and the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Dixon'8' con-
strued the revision to mean that the distinction between principals
in the first or second degree and accessories before the fact was
revived.18 2 According to the court in Dixon, the statute set up two
174. Id. at 725.
175. Id. at 726.
176. Id. at 738.
177. 399 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1981).
178. Id. at 1369. See Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 373, 129 So. 827 (1930).
179. 399 So. 2d at 1369.
180. Id. at 1368-69. See supra note 161.
181. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
182. Id. at 11. The Florida Supreme Court held that the revised legislation showed a
desire on the part of the legislature to revive the distinction between principals and accesso-
ries and to create "two separate and easily distinguishable degrees of crime, depending upon
the presence of the defendant as a principal in the first or second degree." Id.
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degrees of murder, depending on the presence of the defendant as
a principal in the first or second degree. In Adams v. State,88 the
Florida Supreme Court explained that through the construction al-
lowed in Dixon, second degree felony murder is limited only to ac-
cessories before the fact. Thus, according to Adams, if a killing oc-
curs during one of the felonies enumerated in the Florida
statute, 84 the perpetrator is guilty of first degree murder and that
guilt flows to all co-felons personally present. This comes about be-
cause the co-felons personally present, are, by their presence, prin-
cipals in the underlying felony and liable for any crime committed
by all other principals. This is how the law of felony murder (im-
puting a murderous intent to the person who kills) and the law of
principals (making a principal liable for all crimes committed by
his cohorts) combine to make a person who did not in fact kill,
liable for murder. Therefore, under Florida law the only way the
second degree murder statute can apply in a felony murder situa-
tion, and the only way Enmund might have escaped imposition of
the death penalty, is if the felon to whom it applies is an accessory
before the fact and not actually present at the crime. By treating
all principals alike, the Florida laws make the death penalty avail-
able without regard to intent, allowing it for the second degree
principal who may not have intended to kill, but who was responsi-
ble for the killing done by his co-felon.
Justice White showed a desire in his concurring opinion in
Lockett to address the issue of intent with respect to the death
penalty, and he seems to have grasped that opportunity in En-
mund.18 5 The case was a perfect one for his notions on intent, as it
dealt with a defendant who did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt
to kill. The problem with Enmund is its potential for misinterpre-
tation. Conceivably, the case could be seen as prohibiting the
death penalty for felony murder. Enmund was indeed charged
with, and convicted of, first degree felony murder. But to read the
opinion this broadly would be to ignore the Court's specifically ex-
pressed three part "test": whether the defendant killed, intended
to kill, or attempted to kill.186 Such an interpretation would also
ignore the critical distinguishing factor in this case, that is, the ex-
tension of criminal culpability via the common law concept of prin-
183. 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1976).
184. See supra note 161.
185. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
186. See 102 S. Ct. at 3371, where the Court explained its reason for the grant of
certiorari.
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cipals. After this decision, the law of principals is still available for
the imputation of culpability in the conviction stage of the crimi-
nal justice process, but its use becomes restricted in the sentencing
stage.
Douglas R. Nolin
